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The DoD mismanaged the containers used in support of Iraq and Afghanistan over the last 11 years, costing the taxpayer over $750 million in detention charges and container buyouts. The entire DoD container management system requires an extensive and holistic evaluation. This paper proposes 26 recommended initiatives divided into three categories -near-term (between now and the end of FY13), mid-term (FY14-FY15), and long-term (beyond FY15), with an end state of avoiding these unnecessary costs in future operations. The basic strategy is to first keep the management aspect of containers in logistics units exclusively, and to treat this as a simple logistics problemdetermine requirements, capabilities, and shortfalls, then develop a plan. The requirements are determined by the Army container strategy, and the capabilities are unknown until DoD gets an accurate container inventory. The recent bi-annual inventory located only 82% of the government-owned containers worldwide. Only 25% of the containers in theater are drawing detention, and the monthly DoD goal for detention costs is $750,000 -we can do better than that, and this paper proposes several solutions for consideration Container management requires an extensive and holistic review to make the process more efficient and effective starting at the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) level, especially in this current and future fiscally constrained environment. Container management is a DoD-level, strategic issue with excessive fiscal consequences in part because of the current policies between DoD and the commercial carriers. This paper will provide background information to set the stage, examine the entire process, and identify potential near-term, mid-term, and long-term initiatives for consideration, with an end state of avoiding the unnecessary costs in future operations. The current monthly goal for detention costs in DoD recently reduced from $1 million to $750,000. Since only about 25% of the containers used in theater are carrier-owned and subject to detention charges, this goal is very manageable and should be much lower. 2 By focusing on the 2 highest detention areas and locating the additional containers drawing detention, the $750,000 per month figure can be greatly reduced.
The overall focus of this paper is on the management of containers, as well as a symptom of the problem -container detention. Container detention is a charge for holding a carrier-owned shipping container beyond the allowable free time specified in contracts. In Afghanistan, the government is currently allowed 15 days of free time for a dry-cargo shipping container commencing upon delivery at destination. 3 When free time is exhausted, detention is charged each day until the carrier is notified that the container is empty and available for pickup, at which time detention charges stop. Detention applies only to carrier-owned containers. Accrued detention occurs due to DoDs recurring challenges in managing containers in contingency operations. This paper provides several recommendations to get after this.
Background
The DoD relies on containers to move unit equipment and sustainment stocks into and out of theater, with a majority moving sustainment stocks. During the surge in Afghanistan, DoD shipped over 8,000 containers into theater on a monthly basis. That number is currently down to around 4,500 per month, but still presents a massive requirement on the joint distribution system and a challenge for in-transit visibility (ITV). 4 DoD uses eight distinct categories of containers. The types relevant to this paper are "government-owned," "carrier-owned," "leased to US Government," and "carrier-leased to US Government." "Government-owned" containers are used for missions, do not accrue detention charges, but can incur storage charges. "Carrier-owned" containers start accruing detention costs after the designated free time expires -free time varies by container type and country. "Leased to US Government" containers are under a lease 3 agreement for a pre-determined time period, and do not draw detention charges. The current US Government lease contract is with Textainer. "Carrier-leased to US Government" containers are under a lease agreement from a commercial carrier for a pre-determined time period. The other types of containers are "non-military," "pending buyout," "contractor-acquired government-owned property," and "unknown (ownership not identified)." 5 With containers continuing to draw detention charges on a daily basis, the issue of container management and high detention fees caught the attention of military and civilian leaders at the highest levels, and rightfully so. The cost of using the current container management system is excessive. Immediate feedback from the container managers in the field indicated that adequate doctrine and regulations exist, but that the main issue was the lack of enforcement down to the lowest levels. Lower costs were possible due to shorter distances between the port and final destination. This is just one example that demonstrates the visibility of container detention charges and the importance to lawmakers and their constituents that the DoD acts as a good steward of resources. This shortfall in visibility causes excessive detention charges for carrier-owned containers, storage, and other costs averaging over $50 million a year for commercial containers. It also contributes to the lost visibility of the government-owned containers which incurs a cost of greater than $2 billion. A common practice of manual spreadsheets and manual inputs is still used regularly to track containers. With existing technology, we need to get better and more efficient. 12 The study stated that units must ensure the completion of timely property management actions for purchased containers, such as: getting purchased containers on property accountability records; obtaining DoD International Organization for Standards (ISO) serial numbers; and removing old carrier markings and applying DOD identifying markings. Until these actions are accomplished, a commercial container will continue to look like and be inappropriately managed as a carrier-owned asset. 13 The study recommended the endorsement of the JIWG-approved, Distribution
Steering Group-endorsed container management initiatives. These initiatives include:
maintaining the funding and milestones for a single container management system The outcome of the Army container strategy process is the development of a comprehensive DoD container requirement, which drove the development of recommended initiatives in this paper. Thinking strategically, that requirement is the "ends," and the recommended initiatives describe the "ways" and the "means."
Recommended Initiatives
After reviewing the historical data and the entire container management process, this paper proposes several recommended changes and initiatives. These initiatives are divided into three categories defined as near-term (between now and the end of FY13), mid-term (FY14-FY15), and long-term (beyond FY15).
Near-Term (between Now and End of FY13)
The following are recommendations for implementation in the next six months.
The immediacy is based on both the feasibility and necessity to enact the recommendations.
Container management should be treated as a basic logistics issue that is resolved with a straightforward approach -requirements, capabilities, and shortfalls.
This same approach is applied to the container management issue. The starting point is requirements -how many containers are required for DoD based on the Army container strategy study? While this is not an exact science, it is a valid and necessary starting point. This number can always be adjusted, but you need to start somewhere. Next, determine the capabilities -how many government-owned containers do we have worldwide? This is based on a comprehensive inventory that also accounts for condition and availability of these containers. Finally, determine the shortfalls that exist, if any.
Based on the Army container strategy requirements and the 100% inventory, develop a strategy to retrograde, consolidate, repair, reallocate, and project new purchases in the future years. The biggest challenge will be the government-owned containers in Iraq and Afghanistan -how many can we get out of the theater, when will we get them, and what condition will they will be in? While this seems like a simplistic strategy, it must be the starting point to solving the container management issues in DoD.
In addition to determining requirements, an accurate inventory of all governmentowned containers worldwide is essential. We must know how many government-owned containers exist, where they are, and what condition they are in. TTPs. This would allow the teams to not only inventory containers, but to also train the personnel at the different locations on container management. There should be a captain and sergeant first class at a minimum on each team with experience and expertise in container management. This is a difficult task with over 600 "ship to" locations for containers under USC-07. In addition, the 4,500 containers shipped into theater every month makes this inventory a moving target. The focus needs to begin in three areas. Start with the containers currently drawing detention. Only approximately 25% of the containers in theater are drawing detention, yet they account for $750,000
per year in detention charges. 19 The next area is the unknown containers -the list of government-owned containers that do not have a designated geographical location (GEO LOC). The teams can check for these containers at every location they cover to 
Mid-Term (FY14 to FY15)
The next list of recommendations should occur within the next 30 months. This is based on both the ability to enact the recommendations in the near future and their subsequent immediacy.
Develop a Reserve Container Fleet that is similar to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), and would be an agreement between a commercial carrier(s) and DoD to provide a ready fleet of containers for a regular fee. In return, when they are used there would be no detention fees. If we do not have any large military deployments over the next several years, the carriers are compensated and satisfied. If we do, the containers are readily available and the issue of large detention fees will not occur. We have "assured access" in our DoD Master Lease Program which currently provides enough containers for deployment. The DoD plan is that only government-owned containers are used for the first 180 days of any conflict. After that is the sustainment phase where supplies are flowing, using the most carrier-owned containers. 28 Reporting must be streamlined and standardized worldwide. Every agency involved in container management has their own reporting chain, and many of them are not consistent. All agencies should operate off identical data to make the system as a whole more efficient and decisions more effective. There should be one standard automated container report that all decision makers use, and it should be included in
ACAMS.
A December 2010 Army Audit Agency audit said that sufficient methods were not in place to track or validate container condition status. The Army Container Asset Management System (ACAMS) is a web-based software application used to track container location and status, and is the primary container management system for tracking the Army's containers. From ACAMS, personnel can conduct studies on Army container status, location, and disposition from data entered into the system manually by its users. 32 If ACAMS is the system of the future, maximize input from the field, especially from deployed Soldiers that use it on a 21 daily basis. One observation is that there are too many errors when data is input. Make this easier by creating drop down menus for the 4-letter prefix on each container number, and load all of the container numbers into the system to allow selection from a dropdown menu. 33 The ACAMS and IBS-CMM systems must merge into a single system. The USCENTCOM theater uses IBS-CMM as its container management system. It provides a snapshot of both government-owned and carrier-owned containers in theater. The system also estimates detention costs for containers that are not returned to their owners prior to the end of the lease period. Department of the Army developed IBS-CMM to track carrier-owned containers and assist with reducing detention and costs.
The IBS-CMM is the primary database for maintaining physical accountability of containers throughout the USCENTCOM AOR, and provides near real-time tracking of dwell and location. 34 According to the Defense Travel Regulation regarding container management, DoD components must ensure commonality and interoperability of intermodal equipment and infrastructure -to include information systems -between the components and commercial industry. DoD guidance assigns USTRANSCOM responsibility for ensuring that all intermodal container systems are interoperable across DoD and with commercial industry, including associated information systems. The guidance also assigns USTRANSCOM responsibility for developing, publishing, and implementing transportation procedures for intermodal, common-use container systems, including the tracking systems, for other than service-unique or theater-assigned assets.
Contract carriers and military units in theater both enter their container data into the system. The DoD is working on incorporating the two systems to produce a single,
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overall visibility of container status, location, and availability. In 2008, a link between the two systems was created to integrate the data from each system and to indicate data inaccuracies in the systems. The link did not work, which led to challenges with container management information dissemination among stakeholders, such as data gaps in container information. 35 The container system of record is theater specific. The
Army needs to follow the doctrine of, "train as you fight," and standardize the system worldwide (ACAMS) in order to eliminate the theater specific training and additional duty shortfalls. There have been some efforts from FORSCOM to include IBS-CMM (USCENTCOM specific) training in deployment preparation, and at least two agencies in theater provide training (MSDDC and CENTCOM material recovery element). But that's trying to fix a larger, systemic problem that wouldn't exist if there was a single standard logistics information system for container accountability.
Develop a plan to replace overseas contingency operation (OCO) to fund detention charges and container maintenance. OCO funding will not be available in the near future, and these charges will still exist and require payment.
Long-Term (FY15 and beyond)
The final list of recommendations is long-term based on a realistic assessment of DoDs ability to enact them. These changes are just as important as the short-term and mid-term changes, but may take longer.
Explore the use of existing commercial technology, especially on carrier-owned containers. Our current ITV and AV systems are not effective in theater. In October 2010, a DoD inspection of RFID tags at the Hairaton border crossing in Afghanistan revealed that 80 percent of RFID tags had batteries stolen out of them, and some had batteries installed incorrectly. They also found that connectivity to the RFID server might 23 be limited at some bases in Afghanistan. This lack of ITV of equipment and supplies in transit to, within, and out of Afghanistan creates inefficient management of the flow of incoming trucks to logistics hubs and forward operating bases and hinders the secure and effective distribution of materiel within theater. 36 DoD officials in Afghanistan also stated that approximately 40 percent of the RFID tags on cargo bound for a particular base in theater had incorrect or incomplete data "burned" onto them. 37 In May 2012, the USTRANSCOM Commander approved the Improved Joint
Container Management Capability for FY13 funding. This is an integrated solution that leverages data feeds from other systems as well as sharing information with them while still providing users a single focal point for consolidated information. Development to include contract award will commence once FY13 capital dollars are available. The capability is scheduled for two years of development and will provide a joint, standardized, single-user interface supporting life-cycle and operational container management across DOD. The new capability will improve current container management systems, develop new capabilities to cover system gaps, and provide container managers with a single source to access container data thus leading to better container management practices as well as a decrease in detention. 38 The GAO Report made several recommendations for executive action. First, to Develop a plan for phased, projected new container purchasing (including reefer vans). First, identify the condition of all government-owned containers to determine how we will replace the initial large number of containers to be washed out. The average lifespan of DoD containers is 12 years, but the best planning factor for washout is 10 years because of the high usage and conditions in Afghanistan. Use the current planning factor of a 10% washout rate each year, and work into the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) a certain number of new container purchases each year to maintain our capability. 42 This will help avoid lifecycle issues where a large number are 25 washed out at one time. If we buy a large amount in one year, they are projected to all wash out the same year -phased purchasing will prevent or minimize this. We may not need to start buying containers for 5-10 years based on uncertainty regarding how many we will get back from Afghanistan and the changing requirement numbers.
Develop an Army prepositioned stocks plan for containers to allow a theater to have an immediate ECCP, preposition a certain number of empty 20-foot governmentowned containers. As the theater is developed, the capability will exist to provide the logistics commanders flexibility with this capability. This approach seems simplistic, but the best approach to this problem is to treat it like most logistics issues -determine the requirements, capabilities, and shortfalls, then develop a plan. This issue is DoD-wide and extensive, and requires a culture change in the DoD. A phased plan and business-like approach with priority from senior leaders will help to avoid another $750 million bill in the future -we can do much better than that.
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